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随着 1989 年柏林墙的轰然倒塌和苏联 1991 年的解体，人类进入了一个新时代：“世界政治波诡浪谲”，这意味着：在经历了冷战时期势均力敌状态下料峭长冬之后，一切皆成为可能。的确，暴力与冲突骤增，情况越来越令人担忧。但在多边机构中人们曾经看到过希望，规范的统治——不论是对地区性还是对国际性的各方——被看作是针对于强权统治的一剂最佳解毒药。但随着针对美国的 911 恐怖袭击，这一梦想破灭了，强权再次占了上风——并再次以民主的种种美德为其堡垒，以攻防的形式出现。然而，美国占领伊拉克失败、并无力遵照一个紧迫而又几近战术性质的时间表，通过武力形式强制实行民主的事实，已然使规范路径再现生机。中国政府提出“中国和平崛起”的理念，俨然就是这一趋势之体现，尽管针对这其中意图之所在还存在着重重的疑虑。根据时殷弘的说法，就北京而言，中国的和平崛起，将会使之产生一种与国际社会共担其责的责任感。依照扎基·拉伊迪的解释，规范同样也位于欧洲计划的核心，理由很简单：因为自其肇始，这项计划就是要“超越由冲突来决定国与国之间关系的这样一个世界”。——苏鼎德

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the dismantling of the USSR in 1991, came an era when “turbulence in world politics” meant that everything was possible again after the long, frosty years of the Cold War equilibrium. True, violence and the multiplication of conflicts became more worrying. But hope was seen in multilateral institutions, and the reign of norms—be it of regional or international actors—was considered the best antidote to the rule of might. With the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, this dream came to a stop, and once again might prevailed—once more presented as defensive-offensive and entrenched in the virtues of democracy. Nevertheless, the failure of the United States’ occupation of Iraq and its concomitant inability to impose democracy by force according to a very tight, almost tactical, schedule have rejuvenated the path of norms. Despite the doubts surrounding the intent, the “peaceful rise of China,” as proposed by the Chinese government, is one of its embodiments, one that, according to Shi Yinhong, could lead to a shared sense of responsibility on the part of Beijing. Norms are also at the core of the European project, explains Zaki Laïdi, for the simple reason that it was meant, right from the start, “to transcend a world in which relations between states are defined by conflict.” Eric Sautédé

IT IS COMMON knowledge that, for a period following the end of the Cold War, the United States had such a comprehensive and extraordinarily prominent preponderance in the world as to make some people call that era, without much exaggeration, ⁽¹⁾ “the unipolar moment”. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the almost instant victory of the Gulf War and that in Kosovo, and some other major political, economic, and technological events made the “rise [further and further] of America” the number one topic on the agenda of world politics and in discussion of the distribution of international power for years. However, since the September 11th terror attack, and especially since the Iraq War in early 2003, the United States has encountered extraordinarily serious challenges and unending difficulties, with her international power having been partially reversed to a large extent. Most directly it is from Al Qaeda’s transnational terrorism, “the second stage of the war on terror”, and the post-war situation in Iraq that such a development has occurred.

The remarkable relative decline of the United States power from its

summit has also resulted from long-term structural weaknesses. These have been talked about more and more by American policy opinion makers over the past few years, regarding their greater permanence and mid/long-term significance. These discussions are typically represented by, for example, an article published in the July/August 2004 issue of *Foreign Affairs* titled “A Global Power Shift in the Making”. Among frequent discussions of a similar kind in the Western and Asian printed media, this article emphasises a far from unique view that, with China’s “extraordinary economic rise” (which “is likely to continue for several decades”) as the number one factor, “the transfer of power from West to East is gathering pace and soon will dramatically change the context for dealing with international challenges... [while] Asia’s growing economic power is translating into greater political and military power”. ⁽²⁾ Alternatively, one could narrow one’s perspective from global to Asian and observe the ongoing change in the regional/international power structure, which, according to an article (“As U.S. Influence Wanes, A New Asian Community”) published in *The International Herald Tribune* a few hours after George W. Bush was re-elected president of the United States was “the legacy of America’s shrinking influence in Asia over the last four years. A profound rearrangement is under way, with China and its expanding economy [and, as the article says later, China’s ‘diplomatic dexterity’] leading the charge”. In general, the four years of the first Bush Administration “was [a] period when American influence in

1. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1990-1991 (<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19910201faessay6067/charles-krauthammer/the-unipolar-moment.html>). See also Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002 (<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020701faessay8517/stephen-g-brooks-william-c-wohlforth/american-primacy-in-perspective.html>). “If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will. The only things left for dispute are how long it will last and what the implications are for American foreign policy.” “No global challenge to the United States is likely to emerge for the foreseeable future. No country, or group of countries, wants to maneuver itself into a situation in which it will have to contend with the focused enmity of the United States.” *Ibid*.
2. James F. Hoge Jr., “A Global Power Shift in the Making,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2004, (<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701facomment83401/james-f-hoge-jr/a-global-power-shift-in-the-making.html>).

中国和平崛起 与世界秩序

China's Peaceful Rise and World Order

时殷弘 • Shi Yinhong



所周知，美国在冷战结束后一个时期里，拥有全面与极其显赫的全球优势，以致有人将这个时期称作“单极时刻”，这种说法并非言过其实。^①苏联瓦解、海湾战争的骤胜、科索沃战争、以及其他一些政治、经济和技术事件的发展使“美国的崛起”成为世界政治及国际势力分配格局相关议程及探讨当中持续若干年的主导议题。然而，自“9·11”事件以来、尤其在伊拉克战争之后，美国遭遇了自前苏联势力衰落以来最为严重的挑战，面临迄无休止期的诸多困难，其全球势力发生了广泛和深刻的某种局部性的逆转。这种事态发展最直接的原因是基地组织的跨国恐怖主义活动、“第二阶段反恐战争”，以及伊拉克战后局势演变的结果。

美国的势力从上述这种巅峰状态相对向下滑落，其另一个原因是美国的国力存在长期性与结构性的弱点，美国舆论近两三年来越来越关注此方面，因为这些问题属中长期问题，并具有更加持久的意义。《外交》季刊2004年7/8月号登载题为《正在进行中的全球势力转移》一文相当好地代表了这种关注。该文重点提出以中国也许将持续几十年的“非凡的经济勃兴”为主要的现象和最重要的因素，“一种自西向东的势力转移正在加快步伐，并将彻底改变应对全球挑战的基本环境……亚洲日益增长的经济

1. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1990-1991. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19910201faessay6067/charles-krauthammer/the-unipolar-moment.html>. 又见 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020701faessay8517/stephen-g-brooks-william-c-wohlforth/american-primacy-in-perspective.html>.

Asia, the driving force of the region in the second half of the twentieth century, began its downward spiral and America did not see it.”⁽³⁾ Up until now, this far from pleasant situation in American eyes has, at least, not yet changed, if not further developed.

Besides the development of other powers, and primarily China’s rapid peaceful rise, as a major external structural cause, the relative decline of American power has also resulted from several profound internal reasons. They are defined by an article published in *Foreign Policy* in its July/August 2004 issue as “the clay feet of the U.S. colossus”, viz: 1. her “growing dependence on foreign capital to finance excessive private and public consumption”; 2. her severe shortage of sufficient military man-power to meet the formidable requirements of protracted large-scale military occupation, pacification, and political stabilisation; 3. her “republican institutions and political traditions make it difficult to establish a consensus for long-term nation-building projects (overseas). With a few exceptions, most U.S. interventions in the past century have been relatively short lived.”⁽⁴⁾

From a sufficiently long-term perspective, the rise of China will probably be the number one factor outside

the United States in influencing her international power and status. Taking into account the speed of development and the general trend in growth of national power, one may predict that any great power, actual or potential, with the sole exception of the United States, will be remarkably weaker than China in terms of aggregate national strength towards the end of the first part of the twenty-first century, and that, by then, the very wide gap—power wise—that now exists between China and the United States will be greatly narrowed, especially in the structure of the balance of strength in East Asia—if China can permanently sustain her fundamental political and social stability, while positively advancing her politico-economic reforms and appropriately accelerating her military modernisation. The general trend in international politics is the relative decline of the United States power and the increasing rise of that of China, a trend developing to the degree that the transition of power in East Asia would probably be largely completed remarkably earlier than people would have guessed a few years ago.⁽⁵⁾ The whole of this development has great significance, and ranks among the most important mid/long-term factors deciding the future situation of the United States power and the world structure.

The Primary Meaning and the Strategic Benefits of China’s “Peaceful Rise”

China’s rise has been a “peaceful rise” and will continue to be so, at least in the predictable future. At the same time, it is also the fundamental, strategic approach adopted by the Chinese government, with great self-consciousness and

3. Jane Perlez, “As U.S. Influence Wanes, A New Asian Community,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 4th 2004.

4. Niall Ferguson, “A World without Power,” *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2004 (<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2579.php>). As to the first point, it is interesting to read the following words in the above article by Jane Perlez: “When China’s foreign exchange reserves, parked in Treasury bills, funds U.S. budget deficits, should the U.S. Treasury secretary be haranguing the Chinese to revalue their currency?” McCahill [William McCahill II, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing during the second Clinton term] said.”

5. See Shi Yinhong, “The Pre-conditions for China’s Rise: A Discussion from the Perspective of Her Foreign Relations,” in Shi Yinhong, *International Politics and Statecraft*, Beijing, Beijing University Press, 2006.

实力正转化为更强大的政治和军事实力”，近来频频见诸于东西方报刊杂志上类似的讨论当中，这种观点并不是孤立的。⁽²⁾或由全球转为从亚洲地区角度来观察区域内国际势力格局的演变。《国际先驱论坛报》在布什获得连任后

仅仅几个小时就刊登了一篇文章，题为《美国影响力式微之际：一个新的亚洲》；文章指出：上述变化是“过去四年来美国在亚洲的影响力日益退缩的结果。一种深入的重新安排正在进行，中国以及其

正扩张的经济(加上该文后面提到的“中国的外交手段”)是其首要动力”第一届布什政府执政的四年总的来说“是美国在亚洲地区的影响力——这种 20 世纪下半期该区域内的主导力量——开始螺旋下滑……的一个时期。”⁽³⁾而美国人眼里这种很不愉快的局面即使尚未进一步恶化，也至少迄今还没有什么转变。

除了其他国家的发展、首先是中国的迅速和平崛起这一外在结构变化的原因之外，美国势力的相对减弱也有其内在结构的深层原因，美国《对外政策》杂志 2004 年 7/8 月号登载的一篇文章《一个没有霸



Chinese President Hu Jintao is welcomed by Chinese members of the UN mission in Liberia in February 2007 @ AFP

权的世界》将其界定为“美国巨人的泥足”：其中包括(1)美国越来越多地依赖外国资金来为其公私过度的消费“买单”；(2)美国驻外军事力量严重不足，无法应付持久的、

2. James F. Hoge, Jr., “A Global Power Shift in the Making,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2004. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701facomment83401/james-f-hoge-jr/a-global-power-shift-in-the-making.html>.
3. Jane Perlez, “As U.S. Influence Wanes, A New Asian Community,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 4, 2004.

firm determination. As the national orientation for a whole historical period, “peaceful rise” in its most basic sense *directly* means two things: first, China aspires to develop into a world power; second, China will do so without going through any major war or protracted Cold War-style confrontation with another great power or powers. Meanwhile, “peaceful rise” also in nearly the same basic sense *indirectly* means that China aims at becoming a lasting or sustainable first-rate world power, instead of one with a quick rise and an equally quick fall as it has been seen frequently in modern world history. A peaceful rise without a major war or protracted Cold War-style confrontation with another great power or powers, or, in other words, a rise avoiding these two occurrences along with their enormous costs (costs both direct and indirect, and in the short- and long-term), is a requirement not only for becoming a first-rate great power, but also for sustaining such a valuable status as long as possible.⁶

A *peaceful rise* has its increasingly remarkable, huge strategic benefits. For most of the time and in most aspects it overwhelmingly relies on the peaceful and non-military resources of power and the exercise of power. These powers take the form of the economy, foreign trade, diplomacy (especially the attractiveness, persuasiveness and other “soft” functions exerted by non-coercive diplomatic programs, styles, and skills, or those of “smile diplomacy”), culture, and emigration, together with those derived from additional national prestige and

the dissuasiveness (or “soft deterrence”) that would be brought about by success in national development in addition to China’s enormous “naturally endowed” greatness.⁷ All of these are characterised by features of non-violence, progressive accumulation, extensive permeability, and great mutual beneficial effects. Such forces are most irresistible, and incur the least obstruction and lowest cost, as well as the most acceptable consequences. Thus they are in a certain sense the most invincible forces.

There are only two reservations needed here: 1. military strength, military will, and military institutional efficiency are most vital under certain possible, critical emergencies, and equally important, have an essential function to deter the worse-case situation from happening in peacetime, together with the prestige, influence, and coercive, diplomatic capability occasionally required by the nation that can be produced by them; 2. the political effects created by the peaceful resources of power are sometimes less complete or effective, and are often slow in functioning. However, their biggest cutting edge is their relatively low cost and their lasting effects—somewhat like traditional Chinese medicine. Lacking abundant resources but with many internal difficulties, China very particularly has to be obsessive about keeping costs low. Meanwhile, she has great patience and seldom seeks a very quick attainment of her objectives, and therefore can afford the above-mentioned relative slowness. China has great long-term aspirations, and so is more prone to the comparatively lasting effects of power.

6. Shi Yinhong, “The Pre-conditions for China’s Rise...,” *ibid.*

7. These are the sources of China’s increasing power in the world, as well as those of China’s rise itself.

大规模的军事占领、军事维和行动和保持政治稳定的需要；(3)美国的“共和体制和政治传统使之难以就维护国家利益(nation-building)的长期性(海外的)计划项目达成统一的国民共识。”⁽⁴⁾在过去的一个世纪，美国的对外干预行动除个别的几个之外，其余多数都是短命的。

从足够长远的一段时间来看，中国之崛起将有可能成为影响美国国际势力与地位的最主要的因素。以国家的规模、发展的速度与综合国力在增长的总体趋势上来看，如果中国能持续保持国内政治与社会基本稳定，同时积极有效地进行政治经济体制改革，并适当加快军事现代化发展的话，那么可以预料，在21世纪初期即将结束的时候，任何除美国之外已有的或潜在的强国在与中国进行总体实力上作比较时，都将显然逊色。届时，中国在总体实力方面所存在的与美国巨大的差距将大大缩小，在东亚的势力均衡上更将显得如此。在国际政治中，总的趋势是美国的势力相对减弱，中国的影响力相对增强，以至于很可能会提前完成中美在东亚地区的权力转移，大大地早于几年前的估计。⁽⁵⁾这整个事态的发展意义重大，并将成为若干决定未来美国的势力范围与国际架构的最为重要的中长期因素。

中国“和平崛起”的主要含义和战略优势

中国的崛起至少到目前为止，并且在一个可以预见的未来都属于“和

平崛起”。与此同时，这也是中国政府非常明确的基本战略取向。作为一整个历史时期的国家的发展方向，和平崛起最起码意味着两件事情：第一，中国要崛起成为世界强国(World Power)；第二，中国要崛起成为世界强国，但要避免强国之间的全面战争(major war)或长期的冷战对抗。与此同时，和平崛起还意味着第三件事情：中国要争取成为可以持续发展的头等强国，而不是世界近现代史上屡见不鲜的那种其兴也骤、其衰也疾的强国。和平崛起，不与另一强国发生全面战争或持久的冷战对抗，即崛起于避免发生这两种状况及其可能造成的巨大代价的条件下，这不仅是成为头等强国的一个必要条件，也是欲长期保持这重要地位的必要条件。⁽⁶⁾

和平崛起有其越来越明显的、巨大的战略优势。在绝大部分时候以及绝大部分方面它都更加充分地依靠和平的、非军事的实力资源和实力的施展。以经济、对外贸易、外交(尤其是柔性外交纲领、风格与技巧所展现的吸引、说服等“柔性”的力量以及“微笑外交”的其他作用)、文化、移民政策等所体现的力量、以及除了国家巨大的自然资源以外，由国家成功发展所进一步赢得的国家威望与威慑力：⁽⁷⁾所

4. Niall Ferguson, "A World without Power," *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2004. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2579.php>.

5. 参见时殷弘，“中国崛起的条件：从对外关系角度出发的讨论”（该文定稿于2005年7月），载于时殷弘，《国际政治与国家方略》，北京大学出版社2006年版。

6. 时殷弘，“中国崛起的条件：从对外关系角度出发的讨论”。

7. 这些就是愈益增长的中国权势的源泉，也是中国崛起的源泉。

The Fundamental Prospects of China-U.S. Relations

On the assumption that China's peaceful rise is sustained, the United States, in the forthcoming historical period, would probably tend to consider with increasing seriousness, or even eventually adopt, a peaceful "final settlement". That is, to differentiate the balances of strength and influence in different functional and geographical areas through adopting the rationale of "selective preponderances" (instead of "comprehensive superiority") or "advantage distribution". That means accepting the leading position that China may obtain in terms of GDP, volume of foreign trade and diplomatic/economic/political influences in Asia, together with a mutual strategic deterrence between China and the United States, and China's military parity with, or even a marginal superiority to, the U.S. in the former's offshore area (with Taiwan's east coastline as the approximate "demarcation line") and a peaceful, or basically so, reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the United States, with China's acceptance, would retain her lasting position of leadership in technology and her overall military superiority in the world in general, and in the Central and Western Pacific in particular, as well as her predominance in diplomatic influence in some other major regions. The principle of co-existence, bilateral and multilateral policy coordination, and selective cooperation would be practised by both China and the United States in respect of world energy consumption and monetary affairs, global security and environmental protection, major international political issues,

relationships between the main value systems, and other major functional areas. This would be the beginning of the completion of the transition of power discussed here, desirable as well as feasible. In other words, it means a kind of sharing between China and the United States, and the latter's final acceptance of the peaceful rise of China as a world power.

But, on the other hand, the great "structural power rivalry" between China and the United States is becoming broader and more profound than in the past, perhaps like a gathering storm over the distant horizon. The gross volume of China's economy and foreign trade grows at high speed and with a very impressive sustainability; the friction in Sino-American trade has had great structural and independent significance; China's economic/political/diplomatic influence in East Asia and in numerous other regions expands rapidly, with steady consolidation in most cases; the gradual rise of her "popular nationalism" is becoming more and more remarkable; her efforts at military modernisation have escalated on a protracted basis, with continuous two-digit increases in the defence budget for many years; China is striving for strategically significant energy resources over almost all the developing world, driven by an increasingly urgent, economic imperative as well as security considerations. What is particularly important is that China's lasting and escalating military build-up will surely become (or even has already begun to become) the most prominent problem in the minds of American strategists and neo-conservatives. The United States, since Ronald Reagan, has

有这些因素的共同特点就是它们是非暴力的、是渐进性地增强并具有广泛的渗透力、并且也具有互利作用，这样的力量最不易阻挡、阻力最小、成本最低、所造成的后果最易得到接受，因而在一定意义上是最无敌的。

对此，需要有所保留的只是：

(1) 军事力量、意志和组织效率在某些紧急事件可能爆发的紧要关头具有至关重要的作用，并且在平时时期可以发挥震慑作用，防止某些事态恶化，同时也代表一个国家在必要时可以动用的威力、影响力、和强力外交的能力 (2) 和平之力的政治作用有时不那么完整有效，而且往往比较缓慢。但是，它最大的优势就是相对成本低，而且发挥效果的时间比较长，颇似服用中药。中国的资源并不富裕，而内部困难很多，因而一定要格外地讲究保持低成本；中国很有耐心，很少需要去追求“一万年太久只争朝夕”实现的事情，因而可以承受上面所说的相对缓慢的过程；中国具有远大的抱负，因此更倾向于比较持久的力量 and 影响。

权势转移趋势中 中美关系之基本前景

以中国和平崛起趋势持续发展为前提，美国在今后一个历史时期内很可能倾向于更加认真地考虑并有可能逐渐采纳某种以和平方式出现的“最终解决”办法，即根据“优势分配”，或“选择性优势” (selective preponderances) 而

非“全面占优” (comprehensive superiority) 的理论原则，在不同的功能领域 (functional) 和地理范围之内，对不同的力量均衡和影响力对比加以区别对待，接受中国在国内生产总值、对外贸易总量以及对亚洲的外交、经济、及政治影响力方面的领先地位，保持中美间的相互战略威慑态势，接受中国主要在近岸海域 (以台湾东岸海区为界线) 的对美军力均势、或甚至是微弱优势，认可和和平的或基本和平的台海两岸的统一；与此同时，美国获中国认可，长期保持其技术领先地位、以及在全球与中西太平洋地区的军事优势，并且保持其在其他的一些主要地区的外交影响优势。在世界能源消费、货币事务、全球安全、环境保护、主要国际政治问题、主要价值观体系间关系和其他重大功能领域，中美两国将实行求同存异、双边与多边政策协调及有选择合作的原则。这将是中美相互势力转移之势开始完成时的标志，它是可以接受的，也是可行的。换言之，这就是中美之间实现某种共享的局面，亦即美国最终接受中国作为世界性强国的和平崛起。

当然，从另一方面看，中美两国间的中长期“结构性矛盾”正在变得比过去更为深刻，仿佛远处地平线上正在集聚的乌云。中国经济总量和对外贸易持续高速增长；中美间的贸易摩擦越来越凸显其结构性的矛盾并具有越来越重大的意义；中国在东亚乃至世界其他多个地区的经

always determined to maintain military superiority, perceiving it the most important and prominent strategic asset, while China has made up its mind to realise essential military modernisation for her vital national interests and self-respect: this contradiction is not devoid of a possibility of paralysing the future of China-U.S. relations.⁽⁸⁾

A Major Strategic Requirement in the Face of China

For China's grand strategy and its practice, especially in her relations with the United States and other western powers, there are three, newly emerged, major problems with relative long-term significance, which may become even more prominent in the near future. The first is the now partial irrelevance of China's assurance of a peaceful-rise, which has been so successful and effective by words and deeds that, in fact, most informed audience in the world, including the United States government, obviously believe that China is peaceful at the present and will be so, or at least largely so, in the predictable future; what is increasingly needed is her assurance, also by words as well as deeds, of her "responsible rise".

Second, while the second Administration of George W. Bush has become much less unilateralist than the first because of what it has learned

from the terrible strategic and political failure over Iraq and the Middle East, it and other western governments are more and more dissatisfied with China's unilateralism, as they perceive it, along with, of course, her appreciated multilateralism and international cooperation, as in, for examples, her anti-satellite test (ASAT), the search for energy, her African diplomacy, her attitude towards trade friction with western countries and global environmental protection, and her close relations with, or at least excessive tolerance towards, "rogue states" for economic, strategic, and diplomatic gains.

Lastly, Chinese leaders seem still to suppose that repeating and emphasising the "taking a low profile" philosophy and policy, which Deng Xiaoping left as one of his most valuable legacies in foreign policy, can continue to help them assure the world of China's peacefulness and prudence, while, in fact, at the present, it is just this that their American and other western counterparts least like to hear; for in their ears this more and more sounds like a "free-rider" strategy, with avoidance of responsibility and of a cost that China should and is able to bear, and a protracted non-commitment to what they hope or even urge China to do. In short, "international responsibility" rather than "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development" are becoming key words in the issue of China's grand strategy.

The Requirements and the Emerging Effects of Values in the Rise of China

In a very basic sense, major historical innovation, an essential precondition for a nation to become a sustainable world power and proved by modern

8. "Some Chinese commentators are already aware of the dangers. Shi Yinhong, an expert on international relations, warns that growing military air power could be the 'critical issue' in transforming US perceptions of China from economic partner to potential threat. Professor Shi says the US still has a 'baseline tolerance' toward China's military modernization—but that it may be undermined if Beijing acquires the ability to project power far from its borders. 'If this trend continues, someday opinion in the US towards China might change,' he says." Dickie, Mallet and Sevastopulo, "Washington Is Turning Its Attention From the Middle East..." *Financial Times*, April 7th 2005.

济、政治和外交影响力迅速扩大与增强、“大众化的民族主义”(popular nationalism)逐步高涨、军事现代化持续加快、军事预算连续多年以两位数的速度增长；出于应付越来越紧迫的经济压力的需要以及安全方面的考虑，中国在几乎遍及发展中国家各个角落的地方广泛争取具有重大战略意义的能源资源。更重要的是，中国持续和加速发展的军事力量很可能(或甚至已经)成为美国战略家和保守派心目中的最突出的问题。美国自里根政府时代开始，就一直坚决维护它的军事优势，视之为国家最重要、最突出的战略资源；与此同时，中国为了国家的根本利益以及它的尊严，下定决心争取实现必不可少的军事现代化。这一矛盾并非没有可能损毁中美关系的未来。^⑧

中国面临的一大战略需要

对于中国的宏观战略及其实践，尤其是中美以及中国与西方国家的关系方面而言，最近新出现了具有较长期意义的三大问题，并有可能在不久的将来变得更为突出。第一个问题，是中国关于和平崛起的保证现在在一部分意义上变得“文不对题”(irrelevance)了，因为这样的保证在语言和行动两方面都如此地成功和有效，以致于西方大多数“知情的听众”(informed audience)(包括美国政府)实际上显然已相信中国现在是和平的，而且在可预见的未来仍将如此或至少大体如此；而他

们目前所愈益需要的则是中国“负责任的崛起”的有关保证——同样是听其言、观其行。

第二，由于美国从伊拉克与中东战略及政治重大挫折之中，汲取了若干教训，布什政府在其第二届任期内与第一届相比已不再那么一味搞单边主义了；然而，它和其他西方国家政府却对在它们看来是中国方面在搞的“单边主义”感到越来越不满。这种“单边主义”与它们所赞赏的中国方面所实行的多边主义与国际合作同时存在，表现在诸如中国的反卫星试验、对境外能源的追逐、对非洲的外交活动、在中西贸易摩擦及全球环保问题上所表现出来的态度、以及与所谓的“流氓国家”间的密切关系、或至少是对它们的所谓过度姑息等各个方面。

第三，中国领导人似乎仍旧相信重申和强调“韬光养晦”政策能继续起到令世界对中国和平与审慎的姿态放心的作用，然而事实上“韬光养晦”现已成为美国和其他西方国家领导人最不愿意听到的有关中国的话语之一；因为在他们听起来这好象越来越像是一种“免费搭车”的策略，仿佛中国是在回避它所应当承担并且也有能力承担的责任与相应的成本付出，并对西方希望或甚至敦促它去做

8. “中国的某些评论者已经知道危险。……在美国关于中国的观念从经济伙伴转为潜在威胁方面，愈益增长的军事力量可能成为“关键问题”。……美国对中国军事现代化仍有一“容忍底线”，但如果北京取得远为超出其边界的投射力量，它就可能被捅穿。”“如果这趋势发展下去，某天美国对华舆论就可能改变。” Dickie, Mallet and Sevastopulo, “Washington Is Turning Its Attention From the Middle East...,” *Financial Times*, April 7, 2005.

history, relates to China's contribution to world history, her attractiveness to the world, and the encouragement or invigoration of her own people, all relating to values. Since her reform and opening-up to the world until now, what has China contributed to the world in terms of values?

Up till today, one emerging innovation in values by China that may probably have historical, world significance is the conceptual system of a "peaceful rise", together with the implied idea of a "harmonious world", which is still to be clarified and developed in respect of its internal coherence and logic. In the conceptual system and practice of the peaceful rise of China, one very important element has already been amply demonstrated by current events, or, in other words, by the greatest national achievement by China since her reform and opening-up began three decades ago. That is, "the rise of the trading state" emphasised by Richard Rosecrance, a theorist on international relations, in his somewhat famous book published in 1985,⁽⁹⁾ and by the ability "to transform" world politics that this "rise" translates into (the tendency was revealed earlier and expounded in 1977 by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, the authors of the "complex interdependence" theory).⁽¹⁰⁾

With such changes, the utility of war as an instrument for pursuing national interests is rapidly decreasing; the primary issues of "routine" international relations are changing

more and more from territorial-military security to economic and "soft-power" matters; states' performance in respect of the economy, culture, diplomacy, and moral influence is of increasing importance, and, in general, is becoming more important than their military performance; and throughout the world the domestic social modes, fundamental values, major policy notions of the nations, and various non-traditional transnational threats are becoming more prominent. Given such changes, the rise of China as a large "trading state", her idealism, and practical contributions as the advocate of the notion of a "harmonious world" are undoubtedly compatible with the trends at work in world history. And with such changes, China would have so substantial a prospect of becoming a world power that the United States would have to accept it.

The orientation of world order is determined to a large extent by the response to the following question: what is the most influential "international political culture" in the world? This in turn is decided by the answer to another question: which national agent of international political and strategic cultures has achieved the most prominent, major success? More and more, it is apparent that the really successful great power since the end of the Cold War is not the United States but China: China's success is seen in the "rise of the trading state"; the success of her philosophy and fundamental strategy of "focusing on economic construction"; and her success in pursuing a peaceful rise as a world power accompanied by peaceful

9. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York, Basic Books, 1985.

10. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1977.

的事情采取久拖不决的态度。简言之,在一定意义上,“国际责任”而非“和平崛起”或“和平发展”正在成为中国宏观战略问题方面的主关键词。

中国崛起的价值观要求和当今初现的价值效应

归根结底,重大历史性创新作为近现代史所予以证明的、一个世界强国崛起并长盛不衰的前提条件,它关系到是否在价值观念的层面上对世界的发展有所贡献,对世界的人民有所吸引,并对自己的人民产生鼓舞与激励的作用。中国自改革开放至今,在价值观念这方面,对世界作出了什么贡献?

迄今为止,中国所作出的、已开始显现出某种具有世界性历史意义的一个创新价值就是“和平崛起”的理念,以及与之紧密相关、但仍需进一步理顺并发展其内在逻辑连贯性的“和谐世界”的理念。对于中国和平崛起的理论与实践,有一个十分重要的方面已经为当今的局势发展,或中国自改革开放以来所取得的巨大成就予以充分的证明,亦即既国际政治理论家理查德·罗兹克兰斯在其1985发表的相当著名的一部书中所特别提到的“贸易国的兴起”,⁹⁾包括这种发展所反映出来的世界政治思维逻辑发生转变的倾向(这种转变早在1977年就由提出“多元依存”(complex interdependence)理论的罗伯特·基欧汉和约瑟夫·奈指出并加以阐述¹⁰⁾。

在这种转变之中,战争作为国家利益工具的效用在急遽降低,国际关系常规运作中的首要问题,正逐渐从领土—军事安全问题转移到经贸与所谓“软实力”问题上,国家在经济、文化、外交和道义影响方面的表现变得越来越重要,总体而言,是超过了它们在军事方面所表现出来的重要性,全球范围内国家(特别是大国)在内部社会形态、基本价值观及主要政策理念方面的同质性在日益增多,同时各种超越国界的非传统威胁也日益突出。在这样的变化当中,中国作为巨型“贸易国”的兴起以及作为“和谐世界”理念的倡导国在思想与实践方面所作出的贡献,无疑是顺应并推动了世界历史的发展潮流。在这样的变化趋势当中,中国面临着巨大的有利条件,具有成为美国不得不予以接受的世界级大国的可观前景。

国际秩序未来发展的方向在很大程度上要由以下若干问题的答案来加以决定,亦即何种“国际政治文化”与“战略文化”最具影响力?而这个问题的答案又将取决于对另一个问题的回答,即作为国际政治与战略文化的载体,哪个国家将取得最为引人注目的显赫成就?而自冷战结束以来,日益明显的事实是,取得真正成功的大国并不是美国,而是中国:中国作为“贸易国兴起”这方面的成功,以至中国“以经济建设为中心”的思想与基本战略的成功,中国

9. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York, Basic Books, 1985.

10. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, Boston: Little Brown, 1977.

diplomacy. This will to a large extent define the international political culture as well as that of external strategy, thus affecting and partly defining the orientation of the world order.

The Rise of China and the Future World Order

There are three main elements in the world order: the international distribution of power; the system of international norms; and the complex of transnational values. The relationship between China's rise and the future world order is mainly that between that rise and those three elements. Having talked so much about the international distribution of power in the present and in the predictable future, here only the latter two points need to be elaborated.

China's rise and the system of international norms

The nature of international norms partly determines the nature of the whole international system. The relationship between international norms and other elements of the international system is that of a dependent variable to the independent variables. Within the framework of "China's peaceful rise and world order", what need to be emphasised are the following relationships between the independent and dependent variables: the relationship between the expansion of the boundary of the international system—especially the boundary of culture or narrowly defined "civilization"—and the evolution of international norms; and the relationship between the change in the international distribution of power and that evolution.

The current relationships between China and the external world can probably be generalised as two major dimensions. First, the huge Chinese nation-state with its own particular cultural characteristics has been getting involved into or "intertwining" with the external world to a rapidly growing extent and depth and in almost all functional areas including politics, the economy, diplomatic activity, intellectual and cultural intercourse, and demographic movements. This has led to a major expansion of the global international system—an expansion in terms of the richness of its connotation and of its broadly defined boundary. Second, "the rise of China" has been causing changes in the international power structure, with long-term effects that may be more and more likely to be transformative.

According to common sense and the basic experience of the modern world, such a major expansion of the broadly defined boundary of the international system and volatile change in the configuration of international power will surely result in corresponding alterations of international norms. First of all, the fundamental pattern of behaviour of contemporary China ("the rise of [a large] trading state"), then China's culture and values, her international political outlook, and her attitude towards international norms, together with their exchanges, integration, interaction, contradiction and accommodation with their counterparts abroad, will determine a large part of the future evolution of international norms. This might tap a new period in their history.

和平发展的成功，中国和平外交的成功。这将在一定程度上决定国际政治文化及对外战略文化的发展方向，并由此影响与决定部分国际秩序的未来走向。

中国的崛起与未来世界秩序

世界秩序主要有三项基本要素，即国际权势分布、国际规范体系和跨国价值观念体系，中国崛起与未来世界秩序之间的关系主要就表现在与这三项基本要素间的关系方面。关于国际权势分布前已详述，这里则仅就后两项要素展开讨论。

中国崛起与国际规范：国际规范的性质部分决定了整个国际体系的性质，其与其他国际体系要素间的关系是因变量与变量间的关系。在“中国崛起与世界秩序”讨论框架内，有两对变量与因变量之间的关系需要加以特别表明，即：国际体系界限——特别是文化或狭义“文明”的界限——的扩展(或者简单地说是现代国际社会的扩展)与国际规范演变之间的关系；国际权势分布格局的变动与国际规范演变之间的关系。

当今中国与外部世界的关系大概可归为两大方面：第一，中国作为拥有独特文化传统的巨型国家，业已在政治、经济、外交活动、思想与文化交流、人口流动等几乎所有领域，越来越广泛深入地涉入外部世界，与之“交织”(interwining)在一起，由此可以说已经并正在继续导致全球性国际体系的重大扩展——在其内涵丰

富性方面以及广义界定的界限方面；第二，“中国崛起”已经并正在继续导致国际权势结构的变化，其长远效应将越来越有可能是变更性的。

按照常理和现当代世界基本经验，国际体系的广义界限的如此重大的扩展，连同国际权势格局的如此动荡的变迁，势将引发国际规范的有关演变。在其中，首先是当代中国的根本行为模式(巨型“贸易国的兴起”)，然后连同中国的文明、文化、价值取向、国际政治观和国际规范意向，加上它们与中国以外的这些因素的交流、融合、激荡、抵牾和协调，将决定未来国际规范的很大一部分演变。这可能开拓国际规范史的一个新的基本阶段。

中国与基本的跨国价值体系及其创新——最不确定的未来。以非常宏观和浓缩的方式，现代跨国价值观念的基本范畴可以被概括为“经济成长”、“自由”、“社会正义”和“生态保护”。中国改革开放以来最主要的民族成就是在“经济成长”范畴，但这一跨国价值观念远非出自中国的创造，而且现在从政府到舆论，中国人越来越感到这一成就多年来都是在“社会正义”与“生态保护”方面做出过多的牺牲为代价所取得的。中国改革开放以来实现了中国社会的经济“自由”——13亿人口有了经济“自由”当然是世界史上自由的巨大扩展，但经济“自由”本身同样不是中国的价值创新，何

China and the fundamental transnational value complex and their innovation:
A least certain future

Here, one should return to the value requirements of the rise of China discussed above. Modern transnational values can be reduced in a very broad and simple way to four basic categories: “economic growth”, “liberty”, “social justice”, and the newly born “environmental protection”. The primary national achievement that China has made since the initiation of the reform and opening-up policies falls into the category of “economic growth”. But this transnational value itself is definitely not of her own creation. And now, from government to public opinion, the sense is more and more acute that this achievement has been obtained over many years at the expense of “social justice” and “environmental protection”. Since the beginning of reform, the economic “liberty” of Chinese society has been realised. The attainment of economic liberty by 1.3 billion people is, indeed, a great extension of liberty in the history of the world. However, this value itself is not an innovation of China, not to mention that there is still a very long

way to go before China fully realises some other basic liberties or rights of freedom.

Thus, looking at the development of China and its impact on the world, one can say that we Chinese more and more have enormous and firm confidence in the growth of national strength or national power, while self-confidence in peacefully changing the configuration of world power has also remarkably increased. Moreover, it may be expected that, with the rise of China, the system of international norms will experience a major and positive evolution. *But* (and this is the greatest “but”) it is still difficult now to foretell what major contributions of historical world significance contemporary China will make to the compound of transnational values in the world. In this connection, the historical challenge that China faces is: can China create a “Beijing consensus” that is innovative and has much transnational relevance and applicability? We Chinese must finally realise that China has to successfully cope with this challenge if she is to become a truly sustainable world power. 🌸

况中国在其他一些基本自由或自由权的较充分实现方面还有很长的路要走。

因此，综观中国的发展和这种发展对世界的影响，可以说中国目前在力量或权势增进方面越来越有巨大和坚定的信心，在和平地(和正当地)改变世界力量对比或权势格局方面的信心也显著增长。而且可以预料，伴随中国的崛起，国际规范体系势将发生重大的进步性

的演变。但是(这是个最大的“但是”)，现在大概还难以预言当代中国将对世界基本的跨国价值体系有什么世界历史意义的大贡献。在这方面，中国面对的历史性挑战在于：中国能否真正造就出一套具有较大的国际和跨国適切性和创新性的“北京共识”？我们中国人最终将发觉，如果要成为真正长盛不衰的世界强国，中国就必须成功地应对这一挑战。✿

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